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PreServiNg attorNeY-cLieNt PriviLege iN the age oF eLectroNic diScoverY
i. intrOdUCtiOn
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client and 
attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, 
of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which 
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences 
or the apprehension of disclosure.1
 The attorney-client privilege, an essential component of the American legal 
system, fosters open dialogue between clients and their attorneys without fear of 
compelled disclosure of their confidential communications.2 Despite the centuries-
old importance of the attorney-client privilege,3 however, the inadvertent disclosure 
of a client’s confidences can result in privilege waiver in many jurisdictions.4 Once a 
court finds waiver of the privilege as a result of inadvertent disclosure, such 
confidential information may be introduced as evidence at trial.5 The consequences 
of inadvertent disclosure can therefore be damning even if counsel took important 
steps to safeguard the client’s confidences.6
 Electronic discovery7 poses unique problems for preserving attorney-client 
privilege because the discovery of electronically stored information is immensely 
1. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
2. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); United States. v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege is, perhaps, the most sacred of all legally recognized 
privileges, and its preservation is essential to the just and orderly operation of our legal system.”). Some 
commentators and judges, however, have argued that the privilege is unnecessary to foster the attorney-
client relationship, and some have even reasoned that attorneys have a duty in civil litigation to disclose 
all material evidence regardless of any claim of privilege. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for 
Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 51 (1982). While this note does not 
fully address Judge Frankel’s argument, his premise would destroy the privilege and undermine the trust 
required in the attorney-client relationship. Cf. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 412 
(1998) (“The attorney-client privilege promotes trust in the representational relationship, thereby 
facilitating the provision of legal services and ultimately the administration of justice.” (citing Upjohn, 
449 U.S. at 389)). For an in-depth discussion and critique of Judge Frankel’s proposition, see Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continued, the Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 67 (1982). This note specifically defends a robust privilege rule in its proposal and refutes 
the premise that the privilege hinders truth seeking. See infra Part IV.C.
3. See infra Part II.A and sources cited infra note 21.
4. See infra Part II.B and notes 48–49; see also 24 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5507, at 578 (1986) (introducing the controversy and 
jurisdictional split over inadvertent waiver doctrine).
5. See Development in the Law—Privileged Communications: VII. Implied Waiver, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1629, 
1660–61 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287 (D. Mass. 2000) (finding waiver 
of privilege due to inadvertent disclosure caused by paralegal’s mistake, despite massive privilege review).
7. Electronic discovery is the pre-trial “process of collecting, preparing, reviewing, and producing 
electronically stored information” relevant to the disposition of a legal matter and shared with opposing 
counsel in an attempt to discover facts about the matter. The Sedona Conference Glossary: 
E-Discovery & Digital Information Management 18 (2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.
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more complex, costly, and time-consuming compared to paper-based discovery.8 
Although the risk of inadvertent disclosure is always an issue with discovery, the 
sheer volume of electronic information poses an even greater threat that a privileged 
file or e-mail may be overlooked.9 As the volume and complexity of electronically 
stored information has increased, the risk of inadvertent waiver during discovery has 
correspondingly sky-rocketed.10 The process of checking electronic data for privileged 
material is onerous, requiring time-consuming and expensive discovery practices 
called “privilege review.”11 Privilege review requires counsel to check all discoverable 
material for privileged information to protect the client because the slightest oversight 
can be devastating.12 If counsel fails to conduct a thorough review and a privileged 
file is mistakenly produced, a court may find the privilege waived because counsel 
did not adequately safeguard the client’s confidences.13 
 Given these concerns, scholars have questioned whether inadvertent disclosure 
should result in waiver.14 Indeed, courts are side-stepping waiver rules by encouraging 
parties to enter into confidentiality agreements that contract around inadvertent 
waiver of the privilege.15 However, a confidentiality agreement, because it is merely 
contractual, is not binding on third parties or in a separate proceeding unless 
incorporated into a court order,16 and as such, confidentiality agreements are inadequate 
to resolving the issue of inadvertent waiver. Some courts have reasoned that they have 
the authority to issue such non-waiver orders,17 and Congress sanctioned this approach 
thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf [hereinafter The Sedona 
Conference Glossary].
8. See Byers v. Ill. State Police, No. 99-C-8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *10 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002).
9. See id.
10. See Sasha K. Danna, The Impact of Electronic Discovery on Privilege and the Applicability of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1683, 1729–30 (2005); Roberta M. Harding, “Show and 
Tell”: An Analysis of the Scope of the Attorney-Client Waiver Standards, 14 Rev. Litig. 367, 369–71 (1995).
11. See Laura Catherine Daniel, Note, The Dubious Origins and Dangers of Clawback and Quick-Peek 
Agreements: An Argument Against Their Codification in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 663, 673–74 (2005).
12. See id. at 674–75.
13. See id.; see also United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 176–77 & n.10 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
14. See, e.g., McCormick on Evidence § 93, at 144 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (“Given the scope 
of modern discovery and the realities of contemporary litigation, a question of great practical importance 
today is whether . . . inadvertent disclosure should result in waiver.”). 
15. See, e.g., Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Skinner, No. CV 07-735, 2008 WL 4283346, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 17, 2008); see also 1 Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-
Product Doctrine 433 (5th ed. 2007) (explaining that these contractual agreements “will be allowed 
to trump existing case law” on waiver).
16. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(e) (“An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a Federal proceeding is binding 
only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order.”).
17. See, e.g., Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 239 (D. Md. 2005); Rowe 
Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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with the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502.18 Rule 502 permits a federal 
court to order that inadvertent disclosure during discovery will not waive the privilege 
and cannot operate as a “waiver in any other Federal or State proceeding.”19 Rule 502, 
though, is inadequate. The rule does not create uniformity in the law. It fosters 
unpredictability and an incentive for forum shopping because it provides no guidelines 
to courts, and it pushes the burden on clients to obtain a non-waiver order—or face 
the worst.20
 Part II of this note discusses the history of the attorney-client privilege and the 
conflicting law among American jurisdictions on inadvertent waiver. Part III explains 
how electronic discovery threatens the privilege and argues that antiquated waiver 
rules are undermining it. Finally, Part IV analyzes the current trend by parties to 
avoid privilege waiver through confidentiality agreements and court-issued non-
waiver orders. This approach, now sanctioned by Rule 502, merely circumvents the 
real problem facing the legal profession: outdated privilege-waiver rules governed by 
fifty different states, ninety-four federal judicial districts, and twelve federal circuits. 
This note proposes that Congress should enact a uniform privilege rule that adopts a 
client-oriented approach to waiver law.
ii. attOrnEY-CLiEnt priViLEgE and WaiVEr LaW
 A. History of the Attorney-Client Privilege
 The attorney-client privilege has been the cornerstone of the common law system 
ever since the reign of Queen Elizabeth I in the sixteenth century.21 As the late Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist eloquently made clear, the “attorney-client privilege is the 
oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.”22 
The purpose of the privilege, however, has changed over time.23 Centuries ago in 
England, the privilege developed to preserve the honor of attorneys and to allow them 
to maintain client confidences in the face of compelled testimony.24 Since the late 
eighteenth century, the privilege has been rooted in the theory that clients must fully 
disclose their legal problems to their attorneys in order to obtain the best possible and 
18. See Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver, Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 
Stat. 3537 (2008) (codified as Fed. R. Evid. 502 (2008)).
19. Fed. R. Evid. 502(d).
20. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
21. See Berd v. Lovelace, (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch.) (solicitor exempted from compelled testimony); 4 
John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
§ 2290, at 3193–94 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1905); Epstein, supra note 15, at 4.
22. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. Upjohn was issued before William Rehnquist became Chief Justice of the 
United States, although I respectfully apply the title here.
23. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 4.
24. See Wigmore, supra note 21, § 2290, at 3194; Epstein, supra note 15, at 4.
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most honest legal advice.25 The present purpose of the privilege, therefore, is to 
“encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients. . . . 
The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and 
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer[] being fully informed by the 
client.”26 The privilege exists to protect the attorney-client relationship.27
 Three basic presumptions support this rationale. First, clients need attorneys 
because the legal process is too complex to understand without the assistance of 
trained legal professionals.28 Second, the privilege allows clients to disclose—without 
fear of retaliation—all the necessary facts to their attorneys in order to receive sound 
advice during the course of representation.29 Third, clients would hesitate to disclose 
their confidences to their attorneys without the assurance that a court will not later 
compel testimony about such information.30
 Attorney-client privilege is not merely procedural in nature, but substantive law.31 
It is governed by state law even in federal court when a matter concerns a state-created 
right or, in cases of a federal question, governed by a federal court’s interpretation of 
the common law.32 Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503, while never enacted into 
law, is commonly accepted as a concise summary of the privilege:33
[The] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of 
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client, (1) between 
himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer’s representative, or 
(2) between his lawyer and the lawyer’s representative, or (3) by him or his 
lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4) 
between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative 
of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the client.34
25. See In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Wigmore, supra note 21, § 2290, at 3194–95; 
Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 1:3 (2d ed. 1999).
26. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
27. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Epstein, supra 
note 15, at 19.
28. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 cmt. c (2000).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967).
32. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 2007); Willy 
v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 495 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that federal common law governs 
privilege analysis when claims arise under federal question jurisdiction).
33. Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 3 Jack B. Weinstein & 
Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 503.02 (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)); see 
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). The privilege protects 
clients, that is, persons who consult with lawyers to obtain professional legal services and/or advice. 
Weinstein & Berger, § 503.01 (stating the text of United States Supreme Court Standard 503, which 
Congress declined to adopt as Federal Rule of Evidence 503).
34. United States Supreme Court Standard 503, quoted in Weinstein & Berger, supra note 33, § 503.01.
546
PreServiNg attorNeY-cLieNt PriviLege iN the age oF eLectroNic diScoverY
 Under established common law doctrine, the privilege protects attorney-client 
communications when:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the 
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a 
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is 
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the 
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers 
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) 
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the 
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) 
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.35
Privileged communications include attorney-client conversations through electronic 
means,36 and even nonverbal acts and bodily conduct intended to convey information.37 
Despite the privilege’s importance, courts sometimes narrowly construe its application 
on the grounds that the privilege allegedly suppresses the free f low of relevant evidence 
that may impact the resolution of a legal matter.38 In fact, disputes over the privileged 
nature of otherwise discoverable material frequently occur in litigation and are hotly 
contested because the admission of privileged material can be outcome 
determinative.39
 B. Safeguard Your Confidences, or Else!
 A court may find attorney-client privilege waived if a party does not diligently 
safeguard its confidences.40 Nearly all courts will find privilege waiver when a party 
voluntarily discloses its confidences to a third party or its adversary.41 More 
contentious, however, is whether the privilege can be waived by inadvertent 
disclosure.42 Under the inadvertent waiver doctrine, counsel can cause privilege 
waiver by mistakenly disclosing privileged material to the opposing party during 
discovery.43
35. Suss v. MSX Int’l Eng’g Servs., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950)). New York State 
defines privilege under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney 2007).
36. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 69 cmt. b (2000).
37. See id. at cmt. e.
38. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 
596, 602 (8th Cir. 1978); Glen Weissenberger & James J. Duane, Weissenberger’s Federal 
Evidence § 501.3, at 231 (5th ed. 2006).
39. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 2.
40. See United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 782 (10th Cir. 2008).
41. See id.; United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1997).
42. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 188 (2d Cir. 2000).
43. See Daniel, supra note 11, at 665.
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 While American jurisdictions have conf licting common law doctrines on 
inadvertent waiver, the federal courts generally follow one of three established rules. 
The first is a strict waiver rule, where unintentional or even innocent disclosure of a 
client’s confidences will result in an automatic waiver of privilege.44 A minority of 
courts follow this rule, and, in such jurisdictions, “the confidentiality of 
communications covered by [a] privilege must be jealously guarded by the holder of 
the privilege lest it be waived.”45 In stark contrast, an even smaller minority of 
jurisdictions follow a lenient rule whereby the attorney-client privilege cannot be 
waived unless the client expressly and voluntarily waives the privilege.46 The rationale 
behind this rule is that the attorney’s inadvertent disclosure of privileged material 
should not be imputed to the client, who actually holds the privilege, because the 
client did not authorize the disclosure.47 
 The third and most popular approach among federal courts is a balancing test or 
middle-ground approach.48 This approach takes into consideration:
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken by the producing party to 
prevent inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents; (2) the volume of 
discovery versus the extent of the specific disclosure issue; (3) the length of 
time taken by the producing party to rectify the disclosure; and (4) the 
overarching issue of fairness.49
However, since this approach requires a case-by-case analysis, it is prone to 
inconsistent results.50
 Under recently enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 502, inadvertent disclosure 
“does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is 
inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to 
prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the 
44. See In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., Inc., 209 
F. Supp. 2d 269, 285 (D. D.C. 2002).
45. SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
46. See Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990).
47. See Dennis R. Kiker, Waiving the Privilege in a Storm of Data: An Argument for Uniformity and Rationality 
in Dealing with the Inadvertent Production of Privileged Materials in the Age of Electronically Stored 
Information, 12 Rich J.L. & Tech. 15, ¶ 13 (2006).
48. See United States v. Gangi, 1 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Kiker, supra note 47, ¶¶ 14–15.
49. United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 733, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). New York courts follow a similar 
approach:
 In general, disclosure of a privileged document results in waiver of the privilege unless the 
party asserting the privilege meets its burden in proving that (1) it intended to maintain 
confidentiality and took reasonable steps to prevent its disclosure, (2) it promptly sought 
to remedy the situation after learning of the disclosure, and (3) the party in possession of 
the materials will not suffer undue prejudice if a protective order is granted.
 AFA Protective Sys., Inc. v. City of New York, 788 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129–30 (2d Dep’t 2004).
50. Kiker, supra note 47, ¶ 20.
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error.”51 The committee notes of Rule 502 explain that the rule “does not explicitly 
codify [the balancing] test, because it is really a set of non-determinative guidelines 
that vary from case to case. The rule is f lexible enough to accommodate any of those 
listed factors.”52 The rule does, however, explicitly reject the strict waiver doctrine.53 
The middle-ground approach, while advocated by some scholars54 and now sanctioned 
by Rule 502,55 has created substantial uncertainly in privilege-waiver law.56
 C. Waiver Law: An Unpredictable Mess
 The two cases discussed below illustrate that even in jurisdictions following the 
same middle-ground approach, courts still arrive at inconsistent results despite 
similar fact patterns.
 In Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts held that the defendant’s inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged documents effected waiver of the attorney-client privilege.57 The court 
observed that “counsel for [defendant] . . . made the misstep feared by all litigators, 
inadvertently producing . . . privileged documents.”58 Defense counsel reviewed over 
200,000 pages of documents and separated the privileged material into four boxes.59 
Counsel placed these boxes on a separate shelf “to be withheld from production.”60 
When counsel’s outside vendor came to sort and copy the documents for production, 
a paralegal mistakenly allowed the vendor to take the four boxes of privileged 
material.61 As a result, 3821 pages of privileged documents were copied and included 
in the mass production sent to plaintiff ’s counsel.62 After plaintiff refused to return 
the privileged material, the defendant moved to compel return of the inadvertently 
produced documents.63
51. Fed. R. Evid. 502(b).
52. Id. at advisory committee’s note.
53. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(a) advisory committee’s note (“The rule rejects the result in In re Sealed Case, 877 
F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which held that inadvertent disclosure of documents during discovery 
automatically constituted a subject matter waiver.”). In addition to these approaches in federal courts, 
some states have adopted a “significant part test” where the privilege is inadvertently waived when a 
significant part of privileged communication is disclosed. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 912(a) (2005).
54. See Kiker, supra note 47, ¶ 40 (“State and federal courts should adopt the multi-factor standard when 
evaluating whether an inadvertent disclosure results in a waiver of the privilege.”).
55. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) advisory committee’s note.
56. See Danna, supra note 10, at 1729–30.
57. 190 F.R.D. 287, 293 (D. Mass. 2000).
58. Id. at 288.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 288–89.
62. Id. at 289.
63. Id.
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 Applying the balancing test, the court concluded that defense counsel failed to 
take the reasonable precautions necessary and therefore waived the privilege.64 The 
court focused on counsel’s failure to conduct a final (or even cursory) review of the 
copied documents before sending them to the plaintiff, the “sheer magnitude” of the 
disclosure, and counsel’s failure to notice the mistake for five days.65 The court 
concluded that it would be “unjust to reward such gross negligence by providing 
relief from waiver.”66 As one commentator noted, “[f]ew cases demonstrate as 
graphically as the . . . Amgen decision that what one judge will find to have been 
unpardonable carelessness leading to waiver, another, looking at the same set of facts, 
would readily have found to have been pardonable inadvertence.”67
 The result in Amgen is in striking contrast to the result reached by the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland in F.H. Chase, Inc. v. Clark/
Gilford.68 In Chase, the court held that the defendants had not waived the privilege, 
despite the inadvertent production of privileged material.69 During the course of 
discovery, defense counsel produced 7155 documents to the plaintiff, which included 
over 500 privileged documents.70 Before production, counsel separated privileged 
materials in Lotus Notes, an e-mail client program, and created a database containing 
only “non-privileged and responsive documents.”71 A paralegal, however, mistakenly 
sent an outside vendor the entire Lotus Notes database, which included the privileged 
subfolder.72 The vendor formatted the files, printed the entire electronic database, 
and sent the material back to defense counsel for final review.73 Counsel did not 
review the documents before producing them to the plaintiff.74 Nevertheless, the 
court did not find waiver of privilege, despite defense counsel’s total failure to conduct 
even a “cursory review [or spot check] of the documents” after receiving them from 
64. See id. at 292–93.
65. Id. at 292.
66. Id. at 293.
67. Epstein, supra note 15, at 452.
68. 341 F. Supp. 2d 562 (D. Md. 2004).
69. Id. at 565.
70. Id. at 563.
71. Id. at 564.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 563–64. In electronic discovery, the requesting party may state whether it wants the data in 
native format (the original format of the file, for instance, in an e-mail program database) or whether it 
wants the data converted to a different file format or even printed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(C) 
(providing the requesting party the right to “specify the form or forms in which electronically stored 
information is to be produced”); Daniel R. Murray et al., Taking a Byte Out of Discovery: How the Properties 
of Electronically Stored Information Have Shaped E-Discovery Rules, 41 UCC L.J. 1 Art. 2, pt. III (2008).
74. F.H. Chase, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
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the vendor.75 The court found that the defendants “took reasonable precautions to 
prevent” disclosure, especially considering the extensive volume of production.76
 These two cases demonstrate how strikingly similar fact patterns can result in 
contradictory privilege rulings in different courts—even when the two jurisdictions 
follow the same doctrinal approach to inadvertent waiver. This inconsistency should 
give any litigator pause, especially since electronic discovery will only exacerbate 
inadvertent disclosure issues that have plagued paper-based discovery for decades.
iii. ELECtrOniC disCOVErY and priViLEgE UnCErtaintY
 The current uncertainty in privilege-waiver law is further complicated by 
electronic discovery. Due to the staggering volume and complexity of electronically 
stored information produced during discovery, the probability of inadvertent 
disclosure is exceptionally high and, thus, so is the risk of privilege waiver.77 
 A. What Is Electronic Discovery?
 Electronic discovery requires the production and disclosure of electronically 
stored information during the pre-trial litigation process.78 The immense volume and 
duplication of electronically stored information is overwhelming for litigants, 
especially when compared to paper documents.79 Today, the majority of information 
is created or stored electronically; in fact, by some estimates, more than ninety 
percent of information generated today is electronic.80 Information subject to 
electronic discovery includes e-mail; deleted e-mail that can be restored; data, 
program, temporary, system-history, archived, back-up, and deleted files; Internet 
cache files and “cookies”; website downloads; applications and application files 
including word processing and data entry; and electronic information from peripheral 
devices attached to computers, such as printers, external hard-drives, and fax 
machines.81 Most worrisome for litigants is metadata—computer data that reveals 
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 563.
78. See Junk v. Aon Corp., No. 07 Civ. 4640, 2007 WL 4292034, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007); John 
C. McMeekin II & Thao T. Pham, The Age of E-Discovery: Practice Pointers for Preserving and Producing 
Electronic Documents, The Brief, Summer 2008, at 55.
79. See Salvatore Joseph Bauccio, Comment, E-Discovery: Why and How E-mail Is Changing the Way Trials 
Are Won and Lost, 45 Duq. L. Rev. 269 (2007).
80. See The Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Retention and Production, The 
(2004) Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document 
Production, 5 Sedona Conf. J. 151, 151 (2004) [hereinafter Best Practices].
81. See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 96 (D. Md. 2003); Clint A. Corrie, 
Record Retention Requirements in Securities Litigation and Arbitration, 1686 Prac. L. Inst. 41, 56 (2008); 
McMeekin & Pham, supra note 78, at 55.
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“when a document was created, who it was created by, and when it was last accessed 
or edited.”82
 If electronic discovery were a rare occurrence, the daunting amount of 
electronically stored information subject to disclosure would be rather trivial to write 
about in such detail; however, as one study found, e-mail discovery occurs in most 
federal litigation and major employment disputes.83 Further complicating this 
problem, electronically stored information, unlike paper documentation, replicates 
itself.84 For example, over the course of a year, a single e-mail likely will reproduce 
itself an estimated 27,000 to 28,000 times on a computer system.85 If that single 
e-mail contains privileged material, making sure that it does not end up in the hands 
of the opposing party during discovery can indeed be a daunting task.
 B. Electronic Discovery’s Impact
 Attorneys often conduct extensive and expensive privilege review procedures to 
avoid the heightened risk of inadvertent disclosure that comes with electronic 
discovery—especially given the propensity of many courts to find privilege waiver 
when a party fails to take reasonable precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure.86 
As one litigation associate lamented, “reviewing documents for privileged material is 
no picnic; actually, it’s sheer drudgery.”87 One can only imagine then how dreadful 
reviewing terabytes of electronically stored information can be for litigators! 
Undoubtedly, the probability of waiver with electronic discovery has dramatically 
increased as a result of the volume of electronic data, the complex nature of the data, 
and the difficulty in retrieving the information, such as metadata, which is often 
hidden.88
82. Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens with E-Discovery: The 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 Mercer L. Rev. 963, 966 (2008).
83. See Linda Volonino, Electronic Evidence and Computer Forensics, 12 Comm. Ass’n Info. Sys. 457, 462 
(2003), available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol12/iss1/27/.
84. See Rachel Hytken, Comment, Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy 
Their Purposes?, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 875, 879 (2008).
85. See id.
86. See Lucia Cucu, Note, The Requirement for Metadata Production Under Williams v. Sprint/United 
Management Co: An Unnecessary Burden for Litigants Engaged in Electronic Discovery, 93 Cornell L. 
Rev. 221, 232–33 (2007); Joseph Gallagher, Note, E-Ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic 
Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 613, 622 (2007); 
Lee H. Rosenthal, Essay, Privilege Review, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 167 (2006).
87. Daniel A. Cohen, Reviewing Documents for Privilege: A Practical Guide to the Process, 72 N.Y. St. B.J. 43, 
43 (2000).
88. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendment (“Efforts to avoid the risk of 
waiver [in electronic discovery] can impose substantial costs on the party producing the material and the 
time required for the privilege review can substantially delay access for the party seeking discovery.”); 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (Sept. 2005), at 22–23, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf.
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 One of the basic practice recommendations of the Sedona Conference, a renowned 
research institute that aims to address modern legal issues, is for a “responding party 
[to] follow reasonable procedures to protect privileges and objections [in connection 
with the] production of electronic data and documents.”89 Before privilege review 
begins, counsel must first identify electronic sources of information potentially 
relevant for discovery and preserve those sources.90 Then, before turning over relevant 
information to the opposing party, counsel must conduct a review to identify 
privileged material within the relevant data.91 Once counsel has identified the 
privileged material, it must promptly provide a privilege log to the opposing party 
and the court;92 failure to do so will be excused only under rare circumstances.93
 Privilege review of electronically stored information may take many forms 
including: traditional manual review, keyword searches using words or word 
combinations with Boolean operators,94 conceptual searches using semantics and 
thesauri to broaden a keyword search, clustering search methods that statistically 
determine the probability that certain text may be privileged based on conceptual 
searching, and other more advanced techniques.95 A keyword search with seventy 
search terms may not be sufficient to identify all privileged material because, as one 
judge explained, “even a properly designed and executed keyword search may prove 
to be over-inclusive or under-inclusive.”96 Courts have warned that counsel must test 
the accuracy of their keyword searches through a careful manual review of the results 
in order to safely conclude that any given search method is reliable.97
 Given the risk of waiver inherent in electronic discovery, it should be of no 
surprise that a party may elect to conduct time-consuming and expensive privilege 
review, even when it has entered into a confidentiality agreement with the opposing 
party.98 While paralegals or industry consultants often assemble and prepare 
89. Best Practices, supra note 80, at 162.
90. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 34; Stephen F. McKinney & Elizabeth H. Black, The Unsignaled Intersection at 
26 & 45: How to Safely Guide Third Parties Across the E-Discovery Superhighway, 75 Def. Couns. J. 228, 
229 (2008); Best Practices, supra note 80, at 162 (“Organizations must properly preserve electronic data 
and documents that can reasonably be anticipated to be relevant to litigation.” (emphasis omitted)).
91. See McKinney & Black, supra note 90, at 229.
92. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5); United States v. O’Keefe, 252 F.R.D. 26, 29 (D. D.C. 2008); Wunderlich-
Malec Sys., Inc. v. Eisenmann Corp., No. 05-C-04343, 2006 WL 3370700, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 
2006); Best Practices, supra note 80, at 169–70.
93. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Viking Indus., Inc., No. Civ. S-07-2159, 2008 WL 4283614, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 11, 2008) (excusing untimely privilege log).
94. Boolean operators are connectors such as “and,” “or,” and “not” that include or exclude terms from a 
search. The Sedona Conference Glossary, supra note 7, at 6.
95. See The Sedona Conference WG1, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search 
& Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 Sedona Conf. J. 189, 200–03 (2007).
96. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 257 (D. Md. 2008).
97. See id.
98. See Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 169–70.
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electronic data for review, attorneys should conduct the privilege review themselves—or 
a court may conclude that counsel failed to take adequate precautions.99
 Even the most thorough privilege review process, however, may lead to inadvertent 
disclosure when it comes to electronic data.100 The case of Amersham Biosciences Corp. 
v. PerkinElmer, Inc.101 illustrates this problem. In Amersham, the district court reversed 
and remanded the assigned magistrate judge’s order over a factual misunderstanding 
concerning the plaintiff ’s inadvertent disclosure of electronic data.102 Before the start 
of discovery, the magistrate judge issued a stipulation and protective order, whereby 
the parties agreed that the inadvertent production of any document would not waive 
attorney-client privilege.103 The plaintiff ’s production consisted of 133 CDs with 
single-page image files, totaling nearly 800,000 printed pages.104 Included in the 
plaintiff ’s massive production effort were four CDs containing over 500 inadvertently 
produced e-mails with privileged information—all extracted from a single Lotus 
Notes DVD.105
 Before producing this electronic data, plaintiff ’s counsel segregated the privileged 
e-mails into subfolders within Lotus Notes.106 Plaintiff ’s counsel deleted the 
subfolders containing the privileged e-mails before it sent the Lotus Notes DVD to 
an outside vendor.107 The vendor then extracted the e-mails from the DVD and 
converted them into image-based files on four CDs.108 However, the Lotus Notes 
program retained the e-mails in its primary folder, despite counsel’s effort to delete 
them.109 As a result, plaintiff ’s counsel inadvertently produced the e-mails to the 
defendant, notwithstanding its privilege review.110
 The magistrate judge concluded that the plaintiff did not waive the privilege for 
the Lotus Notes e-mails because those e-mails “were imbedded in metadata [after 
they were deleted] and were not apparent on the face of the documents” before the 
Lotus Notes DVD was sent to the vendor.111 The district court, though, disagreed 
99. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 239, 243.
100. See Ashish Prasad & Vazantha Meyers, The Practical Implications of Proposed Rule 502, 8 Sedona Conf. 
J. 133, 133 (2007).
101. No. 03-4901, 2007 WL 329290, at *1 (D. N.J. Jan. 31, 2007).
102. Id. at *1, *5.
103. Id. at *1.
104. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Submission Concerning Inadvertently-Produced Privileged Documents at pt. 
III.A., Amersham Biosciences Corp. v. PerkinElmer, Inc., No. 203-CV-04901 (D. N.J. Jul. 3, 2007).
105. See Amersham, 2007 WL 329290, at *1.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at *2.
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with the magistrate judge’s finding, stating that the privileged nature of the e-mails 
should have been apparent on their face after the vendor converted the e-mails into 
image-files on the four CDs and plaintiff ’s counsel should have noticed this during 
its final spot check.112 In other words, the court doubted whether counsel’s privilege 
review met the reasonable precautions standard necessary to support a finding of no 
waiver, and thus remanded the matter to the magistrate judge for a new waiver 
determination.113
 Despite the non-waiver provision in the magistrate judge’s order, counsel’s diligent 
segregation and deletion of its client’s privileged e-mail, and a final spot check before 
production, the plaintiff in Amersham still had to fight to protect its privileged e-mails 
due to counsel’s inadvertent disclosure.114 Undoubtedly, the issues caused by electronic 
discovery are by no means simple, even for the most conscientious litigator.
 In addition to burdensome review procedures, electronic discovery can cost 
millions of dollars because counsel must sometimes review years’ worth of e-mails in 
order to determine what is both relevant and non-privileged.115 Smaller clients 
especially face breath-taking expenses. For example, in one federal case, a booking 
agency with just nine employees estimated that it would cost nearly $250,000 to 
conduct a complete privilege review of its electronic data.116
 The bottom-line is, extensive and expensive privilege review procedures are a 
necessary component of modern litigation because inadequate privilege review may 
result in privilege waiver.117 It is advisable that attorneys undergo full privilege review 
for their clients—without taking any shortcuts.118
 C. Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
 For some time, courts addressed the issues presented by electronic discovery 
without any direction from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the United States 
Supreme Court.119 Seeking to address these issues, the Supreme Court approved new 
112. Id.
113. See id. at *5–6.
114. See id.
115. See id.; Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 557–58 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
116. See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432.
117. See Daniel, supra note 11, at 665.
118. Cf. Julie Cohen, Note, Look Before You Leap: A Guide to the Law of Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged 
Information in the Era of E-Discovery, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 627, 663 (2008).
119. United States District Judge Shira Scheindlin issued a series of opinions that are considered preeminent in 
the field of electronic discovery. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake II), 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 
V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). United States Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV also addressed 
electronic discovery issues in Rowe, 205 F.R.D. 421, a ground-breaking decision in this field.
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amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that took effect in 2006.120 
These new amendments made electronic information subject to disclosure just like 
paper documents,121 as had already been recognized by many courts.122 As the Rules 
Committee explained, the amendments were enacted to alert courts “to the possible 
need to address the handling of discovery of electronically stored information early 
in the litigation if such discovery is expected to occur.”123 While the rules require a 
party asserting a privilege claim after production to promptly notify the opposing 
party and the court,124 the rules are merely procedural in nature and do “not address 
whether the privilege or protection that is asserted after production was waived by 
the production.”125 Instead, the rules permit courts to apply their own legal rules in 
determining whether waiver occurred.126 Inadvertent waiver of privilege is therefore 
still a possibility under the amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.127
 The rules do, however, encourage parties to enter into confidentiality agreements 
in order to preserve privilege claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, for example, 
provides that a court may, at its discretion, include in its scheduling order “any 
agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-
preparation material after information is produced.”128 Under this rule, a court may 
permit litigants to “agree that if privileged or protected information is inadvertently 
produced, the producing party may by timely notice assert the privilege or protection 
and obtain return of the materials without waiver.”129 Two forms of confidentiality 
agreements in Rule 16—quick-peek and claw-back—are sometimes used in litigation 
as a means by which parties attempt to contract around waiver law.130 Under these 
agreements, the litigants agree to forego, or substantially limit, privilege review 
during discovery with the caveat of having to return any inadvertently produced 
privileged material.131 A quick-peek agreement provides that a producing party may 
120. These new amendments were codified as Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(iii), 26(b)(2), 26(f), and 37(e).
121. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
122. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317 (“[E]lectronic documents are no less subject to disclosure than paper 
records.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendment.
124. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendment.
125. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendment.
126. See id.
127. See Barbara J. Rothstein et al., Managing Discovery of Electronic Information: A Pocket 
Guide for Judges 16 (2007), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/
eldscpkt.pdf.
128. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv).
129. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendment.
130. See Kindall C. James, Comment, Electronic Discovery: Substantially Increasing the Risk of Inadvertent 
Disclosure and the Costs of Privilege Review—Do the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Help?, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 839, 850 (2006).
131. See Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 290.
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turn over all requested documents to the requesting party for initial examination 
without waiving any claim of privilege, even if the producing party did not conduct 
a privilege review.132 The requesting party designates which materials it wants 
produced and then the producing party conducts privilege review only for those 
specifically designated documents.133 In comparison, a claw-back agreement, as 
defined by the Rules Committee, provides “that production without intent to waive 
privilege . . . should not be a waiver so long as the responding party identifies the 
documents mistakenly produced, and that the documents should be returned under 
those circumstances.”134
 The amended rules do not substantially address privilege concerns beyond 
encouraging confidentiality agreements. As discussed in Part IV, infra, these quick-
peek and claw-back agreements do not always protect parties because many courts 
are reluctant to recognize them and they are not binding on non-parties to the 
proceeding.135 This inevitably leaves courts with no choice but to continue applying 
outdated waiver rules when inadvertent disclosure of privileged information occurs 
during electronic discovery.136
iV. a CLiEnt-OriEntEd apprOaCh tO priViLEgE-WaiVEr LaW 
 A. Court Non-Waiver Orders
 To avoid the complicated morass of waiver law, some courts issue non-waiver 
orders, incorporating confidentiality agreements between the parties.137 As discussed 
in Part III.C, supra, confidentiality agreements include quick-peek and claw-back 
agreements. Parties have been entering into confidentiality agreements for some 
time, with varying degrees of support in different jurisdictions.138 A confidentiality 
agreement merely provides contractual protection to a producing party that 
inadvertently discloses privileged material to its opponent.139 That agreement, 
132. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendment; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
133. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 Amendment.
134. Id.
135. See Koch Materials Co. v. Shore Slurry Seal, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 109, 118–19 (D. N.J. 2002); Bowne of 
N.Y.C., Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 478–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
 A stipulated non-waiver may be defensible as between the two parties inasmuch as they 
are free to agree between themselves that certain evidence will not be used. But it is 
questionable whether such agreements should be effective as against third parties. 
Similarly, since courts cannot change the law of evidence by local rule, it is hard to 
justify a discovery order that purports to have the effect of altering the law of waiver.
 Wright & Graham, supra note 4, § 5507, at 579.
136. Cf. Christopher M. Santomassimo et al., Thirteen Steps to Cope with Corporate Privilege Erosion, Ass’n of 
Corp. Couns. Docket 28, 32 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 246.
138. See Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432. But see Koch, 208 F.R.D. at 117.
139. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(e) (“An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a Federal proceeding is binding 
only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order.”).
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therefore, does nothing to prevent another court from finding waiver in a separate 
proceeding if it follows different waiver rules or simply applies the same rules 
differently.140 Thus, for a confidentiality agreement to be truly effective, it must be 
binding on all persons, including non-parties, and in all jurisdictions.141 A court-
issued non-waiver order supposedly accomplishes this goal by stipulating that 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged material made in accordance with ordered 
discovery will not constitute a waiver of the privilege in any jurisdiction.142 While 
this approach is noteworthy, it remains an inadequate solution.
 In Hopson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the assigned magistrate judge 
concluded that courts have the power to issue binding non-waiver orders.143 
Consequently, Hopson is known as the “seminal decision” on the non-waiver 
approach.144 In Hopson, the magistrate judge grounded his authority to protect parties 
from privilege waiver on the notion that information produced during discovery is 
conducted under a judge’s order.145
 The Hopson plaintiffs sued the city of Baltimore and the Baltimore City Police 
Department, alleging that the police department systemically discriminated against 
African American police officers in enforcing its disciplinary code.146 During discovery, 
the plaintiffs sought hard-copy records as well as electronic data from the police 
department.147 At a hearing, the police department raised concerns about the cost and 
burden of performing pre-production privilege review of the records sought by the 
plaintiffs.148 With the two parties gridlocked in a contentious electronic discovery 
dispute, the magistrate judge ordered the two sides to meet and confer “to agree upon 
a reasonable discovery plan for electronic discovery,” and explained that he would 
subsequently “approve a discovery plan and issue an order implementing it.”149
 In Hopson, the magistrate judge emphasized that the matter before him “vividly 
illustrate[d] one of the most challenging aspects of discovery of electronically stored 
information.”150 As the magistrate judge explained, because a producing party’s 
screening of vast quantities of electronic data can be especially burdensome,151 many 
140. See supra note 135. 
141. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(e); Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in 
the Federal Courts: A Proposal for Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. Rev. 211, 240 (2006).
142. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 246.
143. See id. at 232.
144. See Equity Analytics, LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331, 334 (D. D.C. 2008).
145. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 245.
146. Id. at 230.
147. Id. at 231.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 232.
151. See id.
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jurisdictions have recognized the utility of confidentiality agreements so that 
expedited production does not result in inadvertent waiver.152 The magistrate judge 
warned, however, that such agreements may be risky because their effectiveness 
against third parties is questionable.153 Further, the magistrate judge advised that 
parties “would be unwise to assume that such agreements will excuse them from 
undertaking any pre-production privilege review, or doing less of a pre-production 
review than is reasonable under the circumstances.”154 To protect against such 
circumstances, the magistrate judge promised to consider issuing a binding order 
that incorporated the parties’ confidentiality agreement.155 The magistrate judge 
concluded that inadvertent disclosure made pursuant to a court order for compelled, 
expedited discovery cannot result in waiver,156 grounding his reasoning on the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM.157
 While the magistrate judge in Hopson said he would consider issuing a non-
waiver order, he made clear that such an order would not be granted lightly.158 A 
party requesting a non-waiver order, according to the Hopson decision, “bears the 
burden of particularly demonstrating th[e] burden [of discovery] and of providing 
suggested alternatives that reasonably accommodate the requesting party’s legitimate 
discovery needs.”159 For the police department to obtain such an order, the magistrate 
judge noted various factors that the police department must detail in its request, 
including the constraints on the number of available information technology 
personnel, other competing demands for their services within the department, the 
estimated number of hours that it would take them to review the electronic data, and 
any adverse fiscal or operational impact.160 Following Hopson, the number of court-
issued non-waiver orders has greatly proliferated,161 suggesting that courts are looking 
for ways to circumvent privilege-waiver law.
 The failure of a party to obtain a non-waiver order can be fatal to its case. In Victor 
Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,162 the same magistrate judge as in Hopson issued 
152. See id. at 234–35.
153. Id. at 235.
154. Id. at 244.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 241 (citing Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that 
defendant’s inadvertent production of privileged material did not constitute waiver of privilege because 
the production was made under compelled court order for expedited discovery)).
158. See id. at 244.
159. Id. at 245.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Williams v. Taser Int’l Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2007 WL 1630875, at *7 (N.D. Ga. 
June 4, 2007); Pinilla v. Northwings Accessories Corp., No. 07-21564-CIV, 2007 WL 2826608, at *4 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2007).
162. 250 F.R.D. 251. (D. Md. 2008).
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another decision demonstrating the absurdity of the non-waiver approach. This time, 
the magistrate judge explained that despite the defendants’ inadequate privilege review 
of their electronically stored information, “they would have been protected from waiver” 
had they not abandoned their request for a court non-waiver order.163 Ultimately, the 
magistrate judge concluded that the defendants waived privilege because of their failure 
to conduct extensive privilege review and the absence of a non-waiver order.164
 Victor Stanley can be synthesized into a simple proposition: producing parties 
must either engage in extensive (and expensive) privilege review procedures or seek 
(and obtain) a court-issued non-waiver order; otherwise, waiver of attorney-client 
privilege is highly probable.165 The former option is problematic because even 
extensive privilege review can lead to waiver.166 The problem with court-issued non-
waiver orders is discussed below.167 The magistrate judge’s support of non-waiver 
orders suggests that he fully recognized the risks posed by electronic discovery, but 
he then rigidly applied waiver rules outside of the legal fiction of a non-waiver order. 
The inherent inconsistency with this approach leads to only one conclusion: the 
underlying law must be changed.
 B. Federal Rule of Evidence 502 Sanctions Hopson’s Inadequate Approach
  1. Congressional Enactment
 The claimed purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 is to provide “protections 
against waiver of attorney-client privilege.”168 However, Rule 502 inadequately 
addresses the risks posed by inadvertent disclosure in modern litigation. As 
acknowledged by the chair of the Rules Committee, waiver law is “responsible in 
large part for the rising costs of discovery, especially discovery of electronic 
information. In complex litigation lawyers spend significant amounts of time and 
effort to preserve the privilege.”169 The Rules Committee submitted Rule 502 for 
“consideration by Congress as a rule that will effectively limit the skyrocketing costs 
of discovery.”170 Congress enacted the new rule in September of 2008.171 For the 
purposes of this note, the major implication of Rule 502 is that it permits a federal 
court—at its discretion—to issue a non-waiver order, and in light of such an order, 
163. Id. at 262.
164. Id. at 262–63.
165. See generally id.
166. See Prasad & Meyers, supra note 100, at 133.
167. See infra Part IV.B.2.
168. Letter from Lee Rosenthal, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Patrick Leahy 
and Arlen Specter, U.S. Senators (Sept. 26, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Hill_
Letter_re_EV_502.pdf.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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inadvertent disclosure cannot operate as waiver in any other federal or state 
proceeding.172 Rule 502 thus adopts the Hopson non-waiver approach.173
  2. The Inadequacy of Rule 502 and the Non-Waiver Approach
 Rule 502 does not establish a straightforward solution to the current chaos with 
electronic discovery and waiver law; instead, it only serves as a means of expediency. 
Fostering the development of clearer waiver rules would be a more legally sound and 
substantive solution. The Rules Advisory Committee stated that under the non-
waiver approach, “[p]arties should be able to contract around common-law waiver 
rules by entering into confidentiality agreements.”174 This statement is tantamount to 
an admission that common law waiver rules are antiquated and borderline irrelevant. 
More than two decades ago, Professor Richard Marcus identified the absurdity 
behind the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Transamerica,175 remarking that the “duplicity 
involved in entering such [non-waiver] orders points up the unsuitability of the rigid 
waiver doctrine to the actual problems of modern litigation.”176 The magistrate judge 
in Hopson, though, explicitly adopted Transamerica’s reasoning,177 and, in turn, Rule 
502 follows the Hopson approach.178 By enacting Rule 502, Congress failed to directly 
modify antiquated, inconsistent, and rigid waiver rules. Instead, Congress has 
essentially left the courts with the responsibility to sort out modern waiver doctrine 
and to issue non-waiver orders on an ad hoc basis.
 In enacting Rule 502, Congress also failed to recognize that, absent a uniform 
law establishing a clear standard for when courts must issue a non-waiver order at a 
party’s request, a legal patchwork will remain. In fact, Rule 502 permits the current 
split among courts to continue. Critics have contended that non-waiver orders are an 
excessive use of judicial power and that such orders cannot be binding in other 
172. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(d).
173. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) advisory committee’s note.
 There is some dispute on whether a confidentiality order entered in one case is 
enforceable in other proceedings. See generally Hopson v. City of Baltimore, 232 
F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005), for a discussion of this case law. The rule provides that 
when a confidentiality order governing the consequences of disclosure in that case is 
entered in a federal proceeding, its terms are enforceable against non-parties in any 
federal or state proceeding.
 Id.
174. Letter from Hon. Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, to Hon. David F. 
Levi, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 3 (May 15, 2006) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf.
175. Transamerica, 573 F.2d 646.
176. Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1605, 1612–13 
(1986).
177. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. 228; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text.
178. See Fed. R. Evid. 502(d); see also supra text accompanying notes 172–73.
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proceedings.179 For example, Magistrate Judge Ronald Hedges, noting that the 
Hopson approach may be incorrect, pointed out:
Basically, under [the non-waiver approach], if you make a good faith review of 
information and you turn it over, and there is an order protecting against 
waiver, there is no waiver as to third parties. . . . I myself had issues with the 
non-waiver order. Supposedly, one district court is going to bind every other 
court and every other litigant, and will operate on the state and federal level. 
If you stop and think about it, that’s a pretty enormous reach.180
Whether a federal court has the complete authority to determine admissibility of 
privileged information under state law has been contentiously debated for some 
time,181 and is an issue that Rule 502 does not adequately resolve.
 Considering that a number of courts have refused to recognize blanket 
confidentiality agreements or to issue non-waiver orders,182 Rule 502’s codification of 
the non-waiver approach will result in unpredictability. What may result is forum 
shopping among parties to avoid jurisdictions that do not favor non-waiver orders. 
Congress has failed to create a uniform standard because Rule 502 leaves enormous 
discretion to courts in determining the applicability of non-waiver orders.183 
Uniformity in the law is necessary if Congress wishes to foster predictability in 
privilege law and prevent forum shopping.184 Forum shopping has long been 
disfavored in the American legal system,185 but will only increase if litigants are 
forced to seek out the most favorable jurisdictions to resolve their discovery disputes. 
A better approach would treat parties equally, regardless of whether they are in a 
jurisdiction that favors issuing non-waiver orders.
 Finally, Rule 502 places the burden on clients to seek counsel experienced in the 
intricacies of electronic discovery and waiver law to ensure that they can convince a 
judge, like that in Hopson, that a non-waiver order is necessary.186 The non-waiver 
approach under Rule 502 places additional burdens on clients, given the unpredictable 
179. See, e.g., A Magistrate Judge’s Perspective on Electronic Discovery: An Interview with Ronald J. Hedges, N.J. 
Lawyer, Aug. 2007, at 12.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
182. See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 286; Koch, 208 F.R.D at 118–19; Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. 
Sandoz Ltd., 916 F. Supp. 404, 412 (D. N.J. 1995).
183. Fed. R. Evid. 502(d).
184. Cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We are mindful that uniformity 
among the circuits fosters predictability in the invocation of the privilege and suppresses forum shopping.”); 
Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the “uncertainty and 
lack of uniformity” concerning the timeliness of a securities action promotes forum shopping by plaintiffs 
(quoting the American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task 
Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. Law. 645, 647 (1986))).
185. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73–78 (1938).
186. As discussed, even the magistrate judge in Hopson placed a particularly high burden on the defendant 
police department to obtain a non-waiver order. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. at 244.
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nature of how any individual judge may rule.187 A more sound approach would be a 
uniform rule that treats parties equally, regardless of whether their counsel seeks and 
obtains a special “court-fashioned” non-waiver order—a mere legal fiction devised to 
circumvent waiver rules.
 C. Proposal for a Uniform Client-Oriented Solution 
 Given the complexities of electronic discovery, privilege-waiver law requires a 
shift from the inconsistent balancing test toward a more predictable and uniform 
national standard.188 It is fairly certain that electronic discovery will become, if it has 
not already, the primary mode of discovery.189 Considering the inconsistent results in 
privilege-waiver law,190 any meaningful solution to the risk of waiver must be in the 
form of a uniform rule enacted by Congress.191 In order to bind all courts, Congress 
must enact such a uniform privilege rule under its lawmaking powers as opposed to 
the usual rulemaking process.192
 It is a long-standing principle that attorney-client privilege and waiver rules are 
governed by state law.193 Therefore, only a duly enacted congressional statute can 
establish a uniform privilege rule.194 Scholars have reasoned that Congress has the 
full power under the Commerce Clause to nationalize privilege law, and that 
exercising such power would not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment.195 The question 
187. See id.
188. See Cohen, supra note 118, at 651–52.
189. See Best Practices, supra note 80, at 151; Volonino, supra note 83, at 462.
190. See discussion supra Part II.C.
191. See Cohen, supra note 118, at 651–52.
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2006) (“Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary 
privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.”).
193. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(a) (limiting applicability of the federal rules of evidence to “actions, cases, and 
proceedings” in federal courts); Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 731 n.4 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (reasoning 
that a federal court’s determination of the scope of waiver should have no binding effect on the state 
courts); Evans v. Raines, 800 F.2d 884, 887 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Because the attorney-client relationship 
is created and controlled by state law, the nature and extent of the attorney-client privilege is defined by 
state law.”); City of Tucson v. Superior Court, 809 P.2d 428, 430 (Ariz. 1991) (explaining that even the 
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal privilege law is merely “persuasive, but not 
binding” in state court); H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7082–83 (1973) 
(stating that “federal law should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege 
absent a compelling reason”). Moreover, the regulation of lawyer conduct has been governed by state law 
for centuries. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979).
194. See supra note 192.
195. See Nolan Mitchell, Note, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and the Limits of Federal 
Power Over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 691, 694 (2006); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 
Am. U. L. Rev. 59, 65 (2002). The Commerce Clause provides Congress with the power to regulate 
interstate commerce, see U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, which presumptively includes regulation of the 
legal profession to a large degree. The Tenth Amendment is a general restraint on congressional power, 
providing that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. Given that 
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remains as to what Congress should do in light of the current burdens and risks of 
electronic discovery.196
 The most predictable, fair, and uniform solution would be a new Federal Rule of 
Evidence permitting a finding of waiver only when a client or counsel intentionally 
discloses privileged material during discovery or a proceeding, absent a few limited 
policy exceptions. This would comport with the plain meaning of the term “waiver,” 
which for decades has been understood to mean the “intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege,” as defined by the Supreme Court.197 
Under this standard, the mere inadvertent production of privileged information 
would not waive the client’s privilege.198 As noted by one federal judge, “[i]f we are 
serious about the attorney-client privilege and its relation to the client’s welfare, we 
should require more than such negligence by counsel before the client can be deemed 
to have given up the privilege.”199
 A client-oriented solution would support the proposition that only the client can 
waive the privilege and that there must be evidence of intent in order to find that 
waiver occurred.200 It bears mentioning that this note’s proposal would not undermine 
the agency relationship between clients and their attorneys, because attorney conduct 
in the scope of such relationships is imputed to the client.201 This proposal would 
the states have historically controlled privilege law, see Leis, 439 U.S. at 422, it may be argued that 
Congress has no power over this area of law. While there may be arguments against nationalizing 
privilege law, especially among jurists and scholars who advocate a narrowing of the Commerce Clause, 
such issues are not addressed in this note. Further, given the globalization of the legal profession, it 
would be bad policy to permit any tension between federal and state privilege law.
196. Other authors have put forward their own privilege rule proposals, such as the uniform adoption of the 
middle-ground approach, or a federal rule preserving privilege so long as the producing party timely 
asserts privilege upon learning of inadvertent disclosure. See Kiker, supra note 47; Matthew A. Reiber, 
Latching onto Laches: A Rules-Based Alternative for Resolving Questions of Waiver Following the Inadvertent 
Production of Privileged Documents in Federal Court Actions, 38 N.M. L. Rev. 197, 199–200 (2008). 
While this note does not fully address the inadequacy of these proposals, it is worth noting that such 
proposals fail to create bright-line uniform rules, are not client-oriented, and do not radically change 
waiver law. Considering the problem with preserving privilege in electronic discovery today, waiver law 
requires a radical change. Bland proposals that mimic the waiver rules followed in a majority of 
jurisdictions—which have clearly not solved the problem and have produced inconsistent results—do 
little to advance the scholarly discussion.
197. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term 
Disability Plan, 288 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Federal common law and New York common law 
both define waiver as an intentional relinquishment and abandonment of a known right or privilege.”).
198. See Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
199. Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Wigmore, supra note 
21, § 2327, at 3252 (“[S]ince the domination of the modern theory has it been perfectly plain that the 
waiver, like the privilege, belongs solely to the client, and not to the attorney.”) (internal citations 
omitted).
200. See Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
201. See Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F. 2d 951, 956 (4th Cir. 1987); Parkway Gallery Furniture, 
Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 50 (M.D. N.C. 1987); Law Office of 
Douglas T. Harris, Esq. v. Philadelphia Waterfront Partners, LP, 957 A.2d 1223, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2008).
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permit a finding of waiver based on evidence that counsel intentionally disclosed 
privileged material, or in situations where a client attempted to use privileged material 
as both a sword and a shield.202
 Some critics contend that a client-oriented approach immunizes lawyers from the 
negligent handling of documents and encourages sloppy practice.203 This critique is 
wrong because the deterrent effect of rigid waiver rules has minimal benefit compared 
to the enormous waste of resources and expenditures—both for clients and the 
judiciary.204 Further, diligent privilege review and spot-checks before the production 
of electronic data may prove meaningless because, in some circumstances, inadvertent 
disclosure still occurs despite counsel’s best efforts.205 When a client is unaware of an 
inadvertent disclosure by counsel, or when such disclosure is simply inadvertent, 
finding waiver in such circumstances “serves only to punish the innocent.”206 A better 
deterrent would be to punish reckless attorney behavior during discovery. The 
comments to the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
provide that a “lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the 
representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer 
or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are 
subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”207 Likewise, the comments suggest that “[w]hen 
transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation 
of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information 
from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.”208 While it may be argued 
that such ethical obligations are rarely enforced,209 there is no reason why they should 
not be. The goal should be to increase the ethical obligations of attorneys during 
discovery instead of undermining the privilege. Considering the broad discretion 
202. See Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The privilege which protects 
attorney-client communications may not be used both as a sword and a shield. Where a party raises a 
claim which in fairness requires disclosure of the protected communication, the privilege may be 
implicitly waived.”); Wigmore, supra note 21, § 2327, at 3253 (“He cannot be allowed, after disclosing 
as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder.”). For example, if a defendant stock purchaser claims 
that its tax position is reasonable and not misleading because of counsel’s legal advice, the defendant in 
effect “puts at issue the tax advice it received” and cannot hide behind counsel’s advice without disclosing 
it. Chevron Corp., 974 F.2d at 1162–63. While the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that the privilege may be 
implicitly waived this way, the better argument is that such partial disclosure, where the client attempts 
to use the privilege as a sword and a shield, evidences intent to waive.
203. Cf. Dyson v. Amway Corp., No. G88-CV-60, 1990 WL 290683, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 1990); 
Koch, 208 F.R.D. at 118.
204. See Marcus, supra note 176, at 1608–17.
205. See, e.g., Amersham, 2007 WL 329290.
206. Jones v. Eagle-North Hills Shopping Ctr., L.P., 239 F.R.D. 684, 685 (E.D. Okla. 2007).
207. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2007).
208. Id., cmt. 17.
209. Cf. Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 648 (1981) 
(“[S]tudy after study has shown that the current rules of professional conduct are not enforced.”).
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that district courts have in imposing sanctions for violations of discovery orders,210 it 
would be much more sensible for courts to order attorneys to take measures to 
preserve client confidences during discovery than to punish clients for inadvertent 
disclosure.211 Moreover, counsel should (and likely would) seek to prevent inadvertent 
disclosure regardless of waiver law because disclosure of confidential material can 
harm the client or hinder counsel’s litigation strategy once opposing counsel has seen 
it.212 Critics of a client-oriented proposal would be too swift to dismiss an attorney’s 
incentive to prevent this from happening.
 The more compelling argument against a client-oriented approach is that it 
would hinder truth seeking.213 Upon close examination, however, this premise fails. 
The adversarial process is currently the means by which American courts arrive at 
210. See Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983); 8 Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2006, at 96 (2d 
ed. 1994) (explaining that reversal of a discovery order on appeal is very unusual considering “the broad 
discretion the discovery rules vest in the trial court”).
211. For an example of a discovery protective order forbidding the disclosure of particular client confidences, 
see Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, 875 F. Supp. 478, 479 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (“In any pleading, discovery 
document, court appearance or proceedings of any kind, the parties and their attorneys shall not seek or 
disclose client identities where such disclosure would reveal client confidences or secrets, or where such 
disclosure is gratuitous or merely incidental to the questions at issue.”).
212. See David Hricik, Mining for Embedded Data: Is It Ethical to Take Intentional Advantage of Other People’s 
Failures, 8 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 231, 231–32 (2007) (“Inadvertent disclosure of confidential information 
can harm the client by waiving any claim to the protected status of the information or by simply letting 
the cat out of the bag, harming the client regardless of whether the information is admissible at trial.”). 
The ethical issue of what counsel should do once receiving confidential material is beyond the scope of 
this note.
213. Cf. In re Keeper of Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 
2003) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege must be narrowly construed because it comes with substantial 
costs and stands as an obstacle of sorts to the search for truth.” (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 709–10 (1974))). The First Circuit mistakenly applied Nixon’s rationale to the attorney-client 
privilege. Cf. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410 (“Finally, the Independent Counsel, relying on cases 
such as United States v. Nixon and Branzburg v. Hayes urges that privileges be strictly construed because 
they are inconsistent with the paramount judicial goal of truth seeking. But both Nixon and Branzburg 
dealt with the creation of privileges not recognized by the common law, whereas here we deal with one 
of the oldest recognized privileges in the law.”) (internal citations omitted). Nixon concerned a president’s 
abuse of power, where several government and campaign officials were charged with “conspiracy to 
defraud the United States and to obstruct justice.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687. President Nixon claimed an 
absolute executive privilege against turning over any documents related to a criminal prosecution, and 
the Supreme Court held that recognized privileges are not absolute (whether based on the Constitution, 
statute, or common law) and must be construed “in derogation of the search for truth.” Id. at 710. The 
attorney-client privilege, or any other recognized privilege for that matter, should not be construed as 
absolute when it is being misused as a shield to defraud the public or a court. See, e.g., Matter of 
Jacqueline F., 47 N.Y.2d 215 (1979) (holding that attorney was required to reveal the whereabouts of his 
client who had left the state with a child in a possible kidnapping case). This note does not advocate an 
absolute privilege. It is a misunderstanding, however, for courts to draw the conclusion that the privilege 
in general stands as an obstacle to truth—just because a party can plausibly misuse the privilege does not 
render the privilege as an obstacle to truth. To analogize, under the First Circuit’s erroneous rationale, 
prescription drugs would also stand as “an obstacle of sorts” to good health because of occasional misuse. 
See In re Keeper of Records, 348 F.3d at 22.
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the truth.214 In order for the adversarial process to properly function, clients must be 
able to engage in full and frank communications with their attorneys without fear 
that a court will compel disclosure of their confidences.215 The privilege permits 
clients to privately share information with their lawyers that they might otherwise 
conceal if such confidences were subject to discovery.216 As one magistrate judge 
explained, strict waiver rules “create an environment in which parties feel intensified 
pressure to resist disclosing even inconsequential material as to which some privilege 
might arguably be invoked.”217 Thus, lawyers are more inclined to assert privilege 
and to fiercely litigate all discovery disputes when the risks of waiver are high.218 To 
the extent that the privilege hinders truth seeking, the absence of the privilege would 
have the same effect, and possibly an even greater effect, because clients would 
withhold the truth and, as a result, the free f low of confidential communications 
with counsel would be hindered.219 In other words, the privilege creates the “vacuum” 
in which confidential attorney-client communications can take place—without it, 
such communications might be chilled. Preservation of the privilege is also important 
because our adversarial system operates “on the assumption that guilt [or liability] is 
generally best determined not in the privacy of one lawyer’s office but in open court 
under due process.”220
214. See United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1987).
215. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403.
216. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 Va. L. Rev. 597, 
609–10 (1980).
 In assessing a claim of privilege, some commentators analyze the attorney-client 
privilege as though it resulted in a clear loss of information that otherwise would be 
available to a court. This analysis, however, misconstrues a key point about the 
privilege—the privilege is intended to generate information. The privilege creates a 
zone of privacy in which an attorney and client can create information that did not exist 
before and might not exist otherwise.
 Id.
217. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 310 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing 
Marcus, supra note 176).
218. See id.
219. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 309 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(Boggs, J., dissenting). Judge Boggs explains:
Although some view privileges as impediments to the truth-seeking process, the 
calculation is that the attorney-client privilege improves the adversarial process without 
a net loss in the amount of information produced. Insofar as the existence of the 
privilege creates the communication sought, the exclusion of privileged information 
conceals no probative evidence that would otherwise exist without the privilege. The 
absence of the communication would leave the adversarial process with no more 
information and with counsel less able to present focused arguments to the courts.
 Id.
220. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, in The Legal Profession: Responsibility and 
Regulation 197 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 3d ed. 1994) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).
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 A few studies have examined the empirical evidence on the privilege’s role in 
preserving the attorney-client relationship. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the 
Supreme Court addressed such available evidence.221 In noting the findings of two 
studies on the privilege, the Court observed “that a substantial number of clients and 
attorneys think the privilege enhances open communication, and that the absence of a 
privilege would be detrimental to such communication.”222 The Court also discussed 
a study that found that the privilege permits open attorney-client communications, 
but that a few limited exceptions would not hinder this process.223 In fact, the study 
found that a majority of laypeople would withhold confidences from their lawyers 
absent guaranteed confidentiality.224 Further, as the House Committee on the 
Judiciary reported, “[r]ecent empirical evidence supports the Supreme Court’s 
conclusions regarding the importance of attorney-client privilege in the organizational 
context.”225 For example, studies demonstrate that the lack of privilege would chill 
the f low and candor of confidential information between in-house lawyers and their 
clients.226 It is also noteworthy that the New Jersey Supreme Court scrapped its strict 
duty of candor rule—which completely subordinated the privilege for the purpose of 
truth seeking—after much criticism about the rule’s impact on the attorney-client 
relationship.227 In light of the available evidence, the privilege remains vital to the 
preservation of the attorney-client relationship.
 Given the complexity and risks involved with electronic discovery today, absent a 
uniform rule, clients no longer have certainty over privilege protection—a premise 
that clearly violates the Supreme Court’s warning that clients “must be able to predict 
221. See 524 U.S. at 410 n.4.
222. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A 
Study of the Participants, 63 St. John’s L. Rev. 191, 244–46, 261 (1989); Comment, Functional Overlap 
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 
Yale L.J. 1226, 1236 (1962)).
223. See id. (citing Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 352, 382, 386 (1989)).
224. See Zacharias, supra note 223, at 386.
225. H.R. Rep. No. 110-445, at 2 (2007).
226. See id.
227. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s about-face to its strict duty of candor rule confirms the importance of 
privilege. New Jersey’s Rules of Professional Conduct previously prohibited lawyers from “fail[ing] to 
disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the tribunal may tend to be misled by such 
failure.” Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin Frankel ’s 
Proposal for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 613, 638 (2005) (citing former 
version of N.J. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(5)). The New Jersey Court then modified its rule 
after much criticism that it was undermining the adversarial system and the attorney-client privilege. 
See Johanna M. Ogdon, Washington’s New Rules of Professional Conduct: A Balancing Act, 30 Seattle U. 
L. Rev. 245, 278–79 (2006). The current duty of candor rule in New Jersey now prohibits lawyers from 
“fail[ing] to disclose to the tribunal a material fact knowing that the omission is reasonably certain to 
mislead the tribunal, except that it shall not be a breach of this rule if the disclosure is protected by a 
recognized privilege or is otherwise prohibited by law.” N.J. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(5) 
(2004) (emphasis added).
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with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.”228 It 
is thus imperative that Congress enact a robust, uniform, and predictable privilege 
rule that ends the doctrine of inadvertent waiver and prevents further erosion of the 
attorney-client relationship.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 Electronic discovery poses major obstacles to the preservation of the attorney-
client privilege. This problem deserves a serious solution, not a mere circumvention 
of privilege-waiver law. Congress should enact a new Federal Rule of Evidence that 
permits a finding of waiver only when a client or counsel intentionally discloses 
privileged communications, absent a few compelling policy exceptions. The current 
solution, Rule 502229 and the Hopson approach,230 gives courts the discretion to issue 
non-waiver orders to protect parties from waiver during discovery. Such an approach, 
however, is devoid of clear guidelines and thus will likely permit incentives for forum 
shopping and for the current legal chaos to continue. The attorney-client privilege 
has been central to the common law for centuries, ensuring that clients can obtain 
legal representation without fearing reprisal for divulging their innermost 
confidences.231 To allow the complexities of electronic discovery to erode the attorney-
client privilege would be an affront to the American legal system and hinder truth 
seeking in the long-run.
228. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
229. Fed. R. Evid. 502.
230. See Hopson, 232 F.R.D. 228.
231. See Bauer, 132 F.3d at 510.
